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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***QW
Date: 9/8/2021 3:57 PM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

BERNARD H. BRONNER,
derivatively on behalf of Rainforest
Production Holdings, Inc. and
directly on behalf of himself,
Plaintiff,

v.
ROBERTE. HARDY,II,
WILLIAM E. PACKER,JR. and
TRF PRODUCTIONS, LLC, and
RAINFOREST PRODUCTION
HOLDINGS, INC.
Defendants.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESSCASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

Civil Action File No.

2014CV248023

Bus. Case Div. 3

ORDER ON THIRD SET OF CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The abovestyled action is before this Court on: (1) Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment — Third Amended Shareholder Direct and Derivative
Complaint, filed July 20, 2021 and (2) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment — Breach of Contract, filed July 20, 2021. Having reviewed the record
and considered submissionsof the parties, the Court enters the following order!

' Pursuantto the agreement of counsel, these motions were determined solely on the parties’ briefing and without
oral argument. (Sec. Am. Pre-Trial Sched. Order, p. 2; Order Gr. Pl. Mot. for Leaveto file MSJ, pp. 2-3.)

1. SUMMARYOF FACTS

1.1 Primary Shareholders ofRainforest Resolve Disputes with
Reconciliation Agreement
DefendantRainforest Production Holdings, Inc. (“Rainforest”) was registered
as a Georgia corporation in 1996 by founders Defendant Robert E. Hardy (“Hardy”)
and Defendant William E. Packer (“Packer”) to participate in the film production
business. (Compl., § 24; Answer and Countercl., § 24.) In 1998, Hardy and Packer
formed Defendant TRF Productions, LLC (“TRF”) as a subsidiary of Rainforest in
order to develop, produce, anddistribute a film titled Trois. (Defs. SME, q 9; Pl.

Resp. to Defs. SMF, J 9.)?

After production ofthe film, Hardy and Packer were

unable to secure funding from a movie studioto distribute Trois. (Defs. SMF, { 18;
PI. Resp. to Defs. SMF,

18.)

Following a screening of the film at the Acapulco

Black Film Festival in the summerof 1999, Hardy and Packer were introduced to
Plaintiff Bernard H. Bronner(“Bronner”), who expressed interest in investing in
Trois. (Defs. SMF, {| 18-19, 21; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, §§ 18-19, 21.) Bronner
entered into a number of subscription agreements with TRF (collectively
“Subscription Agreement”). (Compl., J 85; Answer and Countercl., 85.) Bronner

2 The two motions before the Court constitute the third set of cross motions for summary judgment filed since the
close of discovery, and they concern the same facts addressed in the second set of cross motions for summary
judgment. Accordingly,this citation as used here and throughoutthis order refers to Defendants’ Statement of Material
Facts and Theories of Non-Recovery,filed January 14, 2021, in support of their second motion forpartial summary
judgmentandPlaintiff's response thereto, filed February 17, 2021. Occasionally, throughout the order, the Court
will refer to other statementsfiled in relation to other motions for summary judgment. When makingsuchcitations,

the Court will so note.

subsequently invested and/or helped to secure investments of over $500,000.00 in
Trois and Rainforest and ultimately became a shareholder, director, and Vice

President of Marketing for Rainforest. (Defs. SMF, {J 22, 27; Pl. Resp. to Defs.
SMF, {J 22, 27.)
After Trois, Rainforest was involved in the production of various films,

including: Trois 2: Pandora’s Box, The Gospel, and Stomp the Yard. (Defs. SMF,
1947, 49, 55; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, 9 47, 49, 55.) However, disagreements arose
regarding the management, day-to-day operations and finances of Rainforest.2 The
parties ultimately sought to resolve their differences via a Shareholder’s
Reconciliation Agreement, dated October 8, 2010, and signed by Rainforest, its
wholly

owned-subsidiary

Rainforest

Films,

Hardy,

Packer,

and

Bronner

(“Reconciliation Agreement”).! (Defs. SUMF, { 84; Pl. Resp. to Defs. SUMF, §
84.)

The Reconciliation Agreement expressly stated Hardy and Packer were

“primarily responsible for and actively involved in the management and oversight
of the day-to-day operations and affairs of [Rainforest] and its affiliates...”
(Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals, § 4.)

Hardy and Packer executed the

Reconciliation Agreement as “Founders” and collectively assumed certain

* See e.g., Defs. SMF, ff 37, 40-42, 62, 64-68, 73, 75, 79-83; PI. Response to Defs. SMF, §§ 37, 40-42, 62, 64-68,
73, 75, 79-83.

‘Anauthenticated copy of the Reconciliation Agreementis attached to the Consolidated Pre-Trial Order, entered
November18, 2020. (Id. 4 10, Ex. A.)

responsibilities and received certain benefits in that capacity. (See e.g., Id., §§ 1.5,
2.2, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1.)
The Reconciliation Agreement required Rainforest to prepare an accounting
of the net revenues received from Trois and deliver it to Bronner (“Trois Financial
Report”), and, depending on the amount of revenues reported, make certain
distributions not only to Bronnerbutto designated Trois investors that Bronner had
been instrumental in recruiting.

(Id., Recitals ] 4, § 1.6.)

The Reconciliation Agreementalso addressed the structure of the Rainforest
business going forward.

It broadly described the purpose of the business as

performing “feature film, television, and other motion businessactivities (the “Core
Business”) that involvethedirect or indirect provision of services by the Founders”
or other Rainforest-related personnel (emphasis in original). (Id., Recitals, 93.) It
indicated the Founders were “primarily responsible” for overseeing“all projects that
are part of its Core Business (suchprojects, collectively, “Core Business Projects”)
undertaken by Rainforest . . . (emphasis in original).” (Id., § 4.)
Article II of the Reconciliation Agreement addresses compensation issues and
outlines the company’s finances. Section 2.1 provides,
[Rainforest] shall continue to use Rainforest Films or anotheroperating
entity of or controlled by [Rainforest] to engage in all Core Business
Projects in whicheither of the Founders receives any compensation or
other paymentforhis services as a result of such Core BusinessProject.
No compensation or other payment may be made to either of the
Founders on account of any service performed by a Founder with
4

respect to any Core Business Project, except as provided in this
Agreementor unless such compensation or other payment is approved
by the Board of Directors . .
Section 2.2 established a base annual salary of $175,000 for Hardy and Packer for
their work on “Core Business activities.” Sections 2.3 and 2.4 outlined how
compensation Hardy and Packerreceivedfromthird parties for their work on Core
Business Projects would be shared with Rainforest. Section 2.3 concernedprojects
where Hardy or Packer worked individually.

Generally, the provision allowed

Hardy or Packer to keep 50% of any “front-end” paymentwith the other 50% being
allocated to Rainforest. With regard to “back-end” compensation payments, 10%
would be paid to the Hardy or Packer, depending on who performed the work, and
90% would be allocated to Rainforest. Section 2.4 concerned projects where the two
worked together. Section 2.5 requires Rainforest to calculate and establish a yearend bonuspool (“Year-End Bonus Pool”) following set parameters and then divide
the pool equally among Hardy, Packer, and Bronner.
Additionally, the Reconciliation Agreement contained release provisions, a
mutual non-disparagement clause, and a clause governing modifications. (Id., §§
1.3-1.5, 3.1, 5.4.) Pursuant to the modification clause, the agreement could only be
modified or amendedby a written instrument approved by the Board of Directors of
Rainforest and signed by or on behalf of Rainforest, Rainforest Films, and

Shareholders owning not less than 75% of the Shares. (Id., § 5.4.)

When the

Reconciliation Agreement was executed, Hardy owned 32.1%, Packer owned 31.5%
and Bronner owned 30.8% of Rainforest shares.

(Reconciliation Agreement,

Recitals, ¥ 1.)
1.2 Disputes Among Primary Shareholders Continue after Reconciliation
Agreement and Rainforest Formally Dissolves.
As detailed below, the record indicates that the compensation structure was
abandonedin early 2012, andit reflects contradictory versions of events leading to
the change.
Following the Stomp the Yard films in 2010, Hardy and Packeraver they did
not work together on any project. (Hardy Depo., p. 297, 300; Hardy Aff., J 39;
Packer Aff, 38.) They claimedtheirefforts to pitch Rainforest projects and expand
its business were unsuccessful.° Hardy and Packerclaim they separately began
pursuing individualprojects, “trying to “capitalize on [their] individual successes.”
(Hardy Dep., p. 297; Packer Dep., May 5, 2018, pp. 248-249.) They argue these
individual projects were not subject to the Reconciliation Agreement. (Hardy Aff.,
4] 30; Packer Aff., 29). By contrast, Bronnerclaims these “loan outs” of Hardy and
Packer werepart of the Rainforest business model, dating from before the Stomp the

> For example, Defendants contend, in an effort to raise Rainforest’s profile and potentially generate future
development opportunities, Packer gave “Executive Producer(vanity) credit to [Rainforest]” for some of his solo
movie projects including Think Like a Man 2, Ride Along, and About Last Night whereas Bronner suggests Hardy and
Packer did not pursue these efforts to boost the Rainforest profile in good faith and were diverting projects and
revenues that belonged to Rainforest. (Defs. SMF, J 102-114; PI. Resp. to Defs. SMF, § 102-114.)

Yard films.

(Packer Dep., Jan. 31, 2018, pp. 166, 169, 172-173; Hardy Dep., pp.

277-279, Pl.’s Appx. of Evid. Mat., filed June 18, 2018, Ex. M.)°

Hardy and Packer claim once they began pursuing their separate individual
projects, they used some of the moneythey earned to make capital contributions to
Rainforest, attempting to keep the companyafloat. (Hardy Aff., J 30; PackerAff.,
{ 29.)

However,the allocation of the payments they made to Rainforest appear

consistent with the Reconciliation Agreement as one-half of the front-end
compensation for these individual projects was allocated to Rainforest.

(Hardy

Dep., p. 301; Reconciliation Agreement, § 2.3.)
In early 2012, the compensation structure of Rainforest was affirmatively
changed. Hardy and Packer decided to stop taking their Rainforest base annual
salaries, and they or their individual companies began to keep all compensation
(front-end and back-end), they received for work on individual projects. (Hardy
Dep., p. 286-288.) Hardy testified Rainforest was struggling financially and the
change was motivated by a desire to help keep the companyafloat by eliminating
the overhead costs of their salaries. Hardy could not recall on whatauthority the
compensation structure was changed. (Id., p. 293.)

° Exhibit M to Pl.’s Appx. of Evid. Mat., filed June 25, 2018 is an April 20, 2014 letter Hardy wrote to Rainforest
shareholdersas identified in his deposition as Exhibit 3. (Hardy Dep., pp. 274-275.)

Z

Packer offered vague and inconsistent testimony about how the decision to
change the compensation structure occurred. Hefirst testified that he, Hardy, and
Bronner together made the determination to change the arrangement after a
discussion involving all three. (Packer Dep., May 5, 2018, p. 242.) Helatertestified
he was uncertain about Bronner’s thoughts regarding the alteration, but Packerdid
notrecall Bronnerraising a “strenuous objection”to the change. (Id., pp. 245-246.)
When questioned about whether Bronner was informed about the change before it
occurred, Packer responded,“[a]t some point [Bronner] would have been informed.

.. I don’t remember when he wasinformed.”” (Id., pp. 246-247.)
The parties continued to disagree on other topics such as the revenues for
Trois and the use of company-ownedresourcesincluding a wireless service account
opened in the name of Rainforest, a Los Angeles, California apartment owned and
paid for by Rainforest, and a company vehicle. (See Defs. SMF, {J 79-83, 96-108;
Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, § 79-83, 96-108.) Further, Bronner asserts Packer used
$400,000.00 of Rainforest’s credit for his personal use without notice to or
authorization from shareholders. (Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, filed June 12, 2018, 7

117.)

’ The record does not contain any evidence that the modification provisions of the Reconciliation Agreement -requiring the change be made in writing with 75% shareholderapproval -- were followed in making this alteration to
Article II. (Reconciliation Agreement, § 5.4.)

Hardy and Packer sought to dissolve Rainforest, and the dissolution of
Rainforest was considered during a June 2, 2014 special meeting of shareholders.
(Defs. SMF, §j 124; PI. Resp. to Defs. SMF, § 124.) Prior to that meeting, Bronner
served the Rainforest Board of Directors, Packer, and Hardy with a “Shareholder

Demand Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-742” wherein Bronnerunsuccessfully lodged
various demands, including that Rainforest: withdraw the Notice of Special Meeting,
investigate whether Packer and Hardy had harmed the companybyfailing to meet
their fiduciary duties, engage an appraiserto evaluate the value of the business, and
produce various business records. (Defs. SMF, filed Feb. 21, 2018, § 151, Ex. P; Pl.
Resp. to Defs. SMF, filed June 21, 2018, 7 151.) During the June 2, 2014 meeting,

the requisite number of Rainforest shares voted in favor of the proposed dissolution
of Rainforest, and the dissolution was later formalized. (Defs. SMF, 79 124 -125,
Pl. Resp. to Defs. SMF, J 124-125.)

2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2.1 Shortly after Rainforest is Dissolved, Bronner Files this Lawsuit.
On June 20, 2014, shortly following Rainforest’s dissolution, Bronnerfiled

this lawsuit, asserting multiple causes of action against Hardy, Packer, and TRF,
lodging someclaimsdirectly on his own behalf and others derivatively on behalf of
Rainforest. One ofPlaintiffs direct claims was a breach of contract claim against
TRF, concerning the Subscription Agreement. (Compl., J{ 84-87.) Bronner’s

complaint made no mention of the Reconciliation Agreement. Bronner took the
position that it was unenforceable. Rainforest Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Bronner, Nos.
A19A1684, A19A2157 (Ga. App., Mar. 4, 2020), p. 16. Bronneralso filed a direct
claim against Hardy and Packer for fraud. (Compl., §§ 89-90.) Defendants filed
various counterclaims that included a count for breach of the Reconciliation
Agreement’s non-disparagementclause. (Countercl., {§ 57-64; Ver. Countercl., {f
64-71.)

Specifically, Defendants claimed Bronner fed information meant to cast

Packerin an unfavorable light to a “tabloid-esque” blog focused on the entertainment
industry. (Defs. SMF, Feb. 21, 2018, 9¥ 126-128.)
2.2 First Set of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment Narrows Issues and
Receives Appellate Review

Discovery continued for more than two years before the partiesfiled theirfirst
cross motions for summary judgment. On January 14, 2019 the Court entered a 55page Order on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment, both granting and denying
summary judgment on various claims. That order wasthe subject of cross appeals,
and on March 25, 2020, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a 45-page unpublished
decision that affirmed in part and reversedin partthe trial court’s order. Rainforest
Prod.

With regard to the first set of cross motions for summary judgment and the
subsequent appellate opinion, the Court finds certain issues are pertinent to this
current set of summary judgmentmotions.
10

First, with regard to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, this Court found the

Reconciliation Agreement was enforceable and that Bronner’s claimsarising from
the Subscription Agreement were barred.

(Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J.,

pp. 10-20.) However, despite this finding, the trial court denied summary judgment,
determining that a jury question remained as to whether Defendants breached the
Reconciliation Agreement. (Id., pp. 19-22.)

The Court of Appeals noted that

Plaintiff had steadfastly maintained throughoutthelitigation that the Reconciliation
Agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. Rainforest Prod., p. 16. It found,
“the trial court erred in transforming Plaintiff's breach of contract claim — expressly
raised in the complaint against TRFfor violations of the Subscription Agreement —
to include claims against Hardy and Packer for violations of the Reconciliation
Agreement.” Id., pp. 17-18. Subsequentto the appellate opinion, Bronner amended
his complaint to assert claims underthe Reconciliation Agreement. Those claims
have been the primary subject of the second and third set of cross motions for
summary judgment.
Second,in ruling on the first set of summary judgment motions, this Court
determined there were “factual disputes in the record regarding whether Defendants
adhered to the compensation structure . . . under the Reconciliation Agreement”

noting “the vague circumstances under which that structure was abandoned” were

11

never fully explained. (Order on Pending Mots. for Summ. J., p. 30.) The Court of
Appeals affirmedstating,
[w]e agree with the trial court that there are disputed issues of material
fact concerning Hardy’s and Packer’s compensation .. . The issue in
Plaintiff's case . . . is whether Hardy’s and Packer’s foregoing of the
compensation structure established in the Reconciliation Agreement
unilaterally changed the compensation structure to one that was less
beneficial to Rainforest. Accordingly, these actions potentially
jeopardized corporate assets, namely Rainforest’s entitlement to
portion of Hardy’s and Packer’s fees for their loan out services.
Id., p. 27 (emphasis added).

This appellate determination is key to many of

Defendants’ arguments in the current set of motions because they claim Rainforest
earned no revenue during the period in question.
Third, the appellate decision addressed whether certain claims should be
pursued directly or derivatively.

This Court granted summary judgment on

Bronner’s direct claim against Hardy and Packer for fraud as Bronnerfailed to
establish he was “uniquely injured” because their alleged misrepresentations
impacting Rainforest’s finances “would result in harm to the corporation and its
shareholders alike, not just Bronner.” (Order on Pending Mot. for Summ., J., pp.
23-25.) The Court of Appeals concurred with the Court’s reasoning that the fraud
claim should be pursued derivatively, not directly, and affirmed the summary
judgment. Rainforest Prod., pp. 33-35.
Fourth, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on two
discrete portions of Bronner’s claims for corporate waste and misappropriation of
12

corporate opportunities that concerned: (1) the payment of excessive salaries to
Hardy and Packer and (2) the transfer of Rainforest intellectual property to Hardy.
Rainforest, pp. 25-28, 37-38.

Other aspects of these claims were not subject to

summary judgment. Id. However, the two aforementioned issues have reappeared
in Bronner’s Third Amended Complaint. (Third Am. Complaint, {J 93(a) and (d),
96(a) and (d).)
On May 1, 2020, this Court entered a judgment order on the remittitur,
formally adopting the appellate decision. Accordingly, at that time, the only claims
remaining in the case were Bronner’s derivative claims against Hardy and Packer
for breach of fiduciary duty, corporate waste and misappropriation of corporate
assets (as they had been limited by the summary judgment order and appellate
opinion, discussed immediately above), Defendants’ counterclaim for Bronner’s
breach of the Reconciliation Agreement’s non-disparagement clause as well as the
parties’ respective claims for attorney’s fees.
2.3 Second Set ofCross Motionsfor Summary Judgment Addresses Plaintiff's
New Claims About Breach ofthe Reconciliation Agreement
On October 21, 2020, before the entry of a Pre-Trial Order, Bronnerfiled a

Second Amended Shareholder Direct and Derivative Complaint(“Second Amended

Complaint”).® It raised one new claim,a direct claim against Hardy and Packerfor

*

Earlier that same day,Plaintifffiled his First Amended Shareholder Direct and Derivative Complaint.
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breaching §§ 1.6 and 2.2-2.5 of the Reconciliation Agreement.

(Second Am.

Compl., J 93-97.)
The deadline forfiling dispositive motions having passed, Defendants sought
leave to pursue a dispositive motion on Bronner’s new breach of contract claim
which this Court permitted. (Defs. Resp. to Mot. for Leave to Amend, pp. 4-5; Am.
Pre-Trial Sched. Order, p. 2.) Subsequently, the parties filed cross motions for
summary judgmenton the newlyasserted contract claim. The Court issued its Order
on Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on April 26, 2021. It addressed a
myriad of arguments but ultimately granted summary judgment to Defendants for
the following reasons.
First, the Court determined thatPlaintiff suffered a special injury and was thus
able to file a direct claim for the breach of §§ 1.6 and 2.5 of the Reconciliation

Agreement. (Order on Cross Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 29-30.) However, the Court
granted summary judgment because Plaintiff had sued Hardy and Packer for these
alleged breaches when the Reconciliation Agreement expressly obligated Rainforest
to prepare the Trois Financial Report and administer the Year-End BonusPool. (Id.,
pp. 31-33.) Second, as concerned any breach of the Reconciliation Agreement’s
compensation provisions found in §§ 2.2-2.4, the Court determined that, although
this breach could impact the revenues used to calculate the Year-End Bonus Pool
established in § 2.5 that only benefited Bronner, Hardy, and Packer,“the claimitself
14

— for lost revenues — would inure to the benefit of all Rainforest shareholders, not

just Bronner.” (Id., p. 30.) Therefore, the Court concluded this claim for breach of
contract should be pursued derivatively. (Id.)
2.4 Third Set of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment Address Plaintiff's
Attempt to Re-frame his Claims for Breach of the Reconciliation
Agreement

After the Court’s order resolving the second set of cross motions for summary
judgment, Bronner soughtand received leave to amend his complaintto re-framehis
breach of contract claims. (Order Gr. Pl. Mot. for Leave to File his Third Am.
Compl., entered June 17, 2021.)

His Third Amended Shareholder Direct and

Derivative Complaint was filed on June 28, 2021. It added direct claims against
Rainforest for breaches of §§ 1.6 and 2.5 of the Reconciliation Agreement and
derivative claims against Hardy and Packer for breach of §§ 2.2-2.4 of the
Reconciliation Agreement. (Third Am. Compl., {f 83-85; 99-101.) The Court also
agreed to allow the parties to file dispositive motions on the newly-framed claims
which ledto this third set of cross motions for summary judgment. (Second Am.
Pre-Trial Sched. Order, p. 2; Order Gr. Pl. Mot. for Leave to File Mot. for Summ.

J., p. 2.)
3. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 310 Ga. 289, 292 (2020), the Georgia

Supreme Court recently reiterated the “well-established principles” guidinga trial
15

court’s review of a motion for summary judgment. “A trial court can grant summary
judgment to a movingparty only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the undisputed evidence warrants judgment as a matter of law. See O.C.G.A. § 911-56(c). In reviewing the evidence, a court must construeall facts and draw all
inferences in favor of the non-movant.” Ward-Poag expressly relied on Messex v.
Lynch, 255 Ga. 208, 210 (1985) which further provides, “[t]he party opposing the
motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a
genuine issue exists, and the trial court must give that party the benefit ofall
favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.”
Further, when cross-motions for summary judgmentare filed, “each party
must show that there is no genuineissue of material fact regarding the resolution of
the essential points of inquiry and that each, respectively, is entitled to summary
judgment; either party, to prevail by summary judgment, must bear its burden of
proof.” Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 335 Ga. App. 302 (2015)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
4. ANALYSIS
4.1 Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
4.1.1 Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of § 1.6 of the Reconciliation
Agreement _- 7rois Financial Report

With regard to the Trois Financial Report, Rainforest was to provide Bronner
with a report, “setting forth in reasonable detail the financial results of the feature
16

film Trois, which report shall be prepared consistent with prevailing financial
accounting practices in the feature film industry.” (Reconciliation Agreement, §
1.6.) Depending on the net revenues established by that report, Rainforest would
be required to make certain distributions to Trois investors. (Id.) Acting pursuant
to this provision, Rainforest provided Bronner with a one-page summary ofcertain
financial information about Trois reflecting an estimated loss of $35,700. (Defs.
SMF, filed Feb. 21, 2018, 4 100; Ex. L; Pl. Appx. in Resp. to Defs. SMF, filed June

26, 2018, { 100, Ex. AA; Watson Dep., pp. 179-184.)
Defendants now contend § 1.6 is impermissibly vague because it lacks
necessary guidance about preparation of the Trois Financial Report. (Defs. MPSJ,
pp. 4-7.)

Specifically, they complain every aspect of this provision is deficient

becauseit fails to meaningfully describe the level of “reasonable detail” required,
what “financial results” should be reported, or the “prevailing financial accounting
practices in the feature film industry.” (Id., p. 6.) Accordingly, Defendants assert
the provision is so uncertain as to be unenforceable and seem to contend it should
be severed from the remainderof the contract.? See generally Burns v. Dees, 252

° Defendants ask the Court to use § 5.7 of the Reconciliation Agreement to sever § 1.6 from the Reconciliation
Agreement; however, they merely describe § 5.7 as a “severability provision.” (Defs. MPSJ, n. 2.) Considered in
its entirety, § 5.7 states:

5.7 Partial Invalidity. All rights and restrictions contained herein may be exercised and shall be
applicable and binding only to the extent that they do notviolate any applicable laws, and they are intended
to be limited to the extent necessary so that they will not render this [Reconciliation] Agreement illegal,
invalid or unenforceable. If any term of this Agreementshall be held tobeillegal, invalid, or unenforceable,
so long as the rights or obligations of any party to this Agreement are not materially and adversely
affected thereby, it is the intention of the parties that the remaining terms hereof shall constitute their
17

Ga. App. 598, 601— 602, (2001)(a contract is unenforceable “if its terms are
incomplete, vague, indefinite or uncertain”).
Georgia law establishes a high bar for holding a contract unenforceable.
“[A] trial court must bear in mind that the law leans against the destruction of

contracts on the ground ofuncertainty, and the uncertainty and indefiniteness at issue
must be extreme to warrant the conclusion that a contract cannot be enforced.”
Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Accounting, LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 382-83 (2015)
citing Triple Eagle Assoc. v. PBK,Inc., 307 Ga. App. 17, 19-20 (2010). Similarly,
O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) directs, “[t]he construction which will uphold a contract in
whole and in every part is to be preferred . . .” See also Milliken & Co. v. Georgia
Power Co., 354 Ga. App. 98, 100 (2020)(“courts must favor a construction that
upholds the contract in whole and in every part.”)
In considering whethera contract provision is impermissibly vague, Georgia
law further provides,
[i]t is unnecessary that a contract state definitively and specifically all facts in
detail to which the parties may be agreeing, but as to such matters, it will be
sufficiently definite and certain if it contains matters which will enable the

agreementwith respect to the subject matter hereof, and all such remaining terms shall remain infull force
andeffect, and to the extent legally permissible, any illegal, invalid or unenforceable provision of this
Agreement shall be replaced by a valid provision that will implement the commercial purpose of the
illegal, invalid or unenforceable provision (emphasis supplied).
Defendants fail to address its particular nuancesorexplain how § 5.7 should properly be applied here if the Court
were to declare § 1.6 invalid.

18

courts, under proper rules of construction, to ascertain the terms and
conditions on whichthe parties intended to bind themselves.
Vernon at 383.

Evaluating the provision at issue, the Court is also mindful ofthe longstanding
canon of contract construction that, “[w]ords generally bear their usual and common
signification.” O.C.G.A. 13-2-2(2). In construing § 1.6, the Court finds nothing
about its requirementfor a reasonably detailed account of financial results prepared
in accordance with prevailing financial accounting practices in the feature film
industry to display the “extreme” level of uncertainty that would deem it
unenforceable. Vernon.

Alternatively, Defendants argue that Rainforest substantially complied with
the requirement to provide Bronner with the reasonably-detailed Trois Financial
Report. (Defs. Third MPSJ, p. 6.) The Court’s most recent summary judgmentorder
examinedthe alleged deficiencies in the formal Trois Financial Report supplied to
Bronner.!° It also recounted Defendants’ other efforts to provide Bronner with
information about the financial results of Trois — including meetings between

10 As previously determined by the Court,
... the Trois Financial Report identified by Defendants is a cursory, one-page document. (R. Cits.) Bronner
testified the statement he received was incomplete as it was missing information about revenues obtained
from television rights. (R. Cit.) Packer acknowledged the 7rois Financial Report provided Bronner was
incomplete and lacked detail. (R. Cit.) He testified one would haveto look outside the four cornersof the
document, “to get specificity.” (R. Cit.)
(Order on Cross Mots. for Summ. J., p. 24.)

19

Bronner and the company accountant who provided Bronner with additional data
and answered his questions aboutthe financial performanceof Trois.'! At that time,
the Court rejected the Defendants’ argument that summary judgment should be
entered, finding a disputed question of material fact as to whether Rainforest had
fulfilled this contract term. (Order on Cross Mots. for Summ. J., pp. 23-25.) There
has been no additional discovery or evidence on this issue since the Court entered
that order just a few months ago. The Defendants’ instant motion simply offers the
new argumentthat Rainforest substantially complied with § 1.6.
In Georgia,
[o]ur general rule with respect to compliance with contract termsis not
strict compliance, but substantial compliance. At commonlaw strict
and literal performance of the terms of the contract was required; but
by rules of equity, either adopted by statute or recognizedbythe courts,
a substantial compliance with the terms of the contractis sufficient.

11 As previously determined by the Court, Hardy and Packeroffered evidence they had,
provided Bronnerwith the Trois Accounting prepared by [the company accountant] based
uponall the financial information related to Trois. Bronner was also provided with all
requested financial documentsrelated to Trois and the Reconciliation Agreement. After
receiving the Trois Accounting and the additional financial documents, Bronner never
expressed dissatisfaction with the Trois accounting, requested additional information, or
otherwise expressed that the Trois accounting failed to comply with the Reconciliation
Agreement.
(R. Cits.) The company accountanttestified he met with Bronner on different occasions to review the
information about Trois revenues and he produced to Bronnerall the 7rois financial information, and he
never received a request for additional information or a protest that the information he provided was
insufficient. (R. Cit.)
(Order on Cross Mots. for Summ. J., p. 24.)
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TRST Atlanta, Inc. v. 1815 Exch., Inc., 220 Ga. App. 184, 187 (1996)(citations and

punctuation omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-4-20 (contract performance “must be
substantially in compliance with the spirit and the letter of the contract and
completed within a reasonable time.”)
The Court finds the one case cited by Defendants, Labat v. Bank of Coweta,

218 Ga. App. 187 (1995), distinguishable.

In Labat, the defendant bank was

contractually required to mail plaintiff, its customer, notice of an account closure
together with a check for any account proceeds. Id. at 190. While the bank failed to
provideits customer with mailed, written notice of the closure,it attempted to notify
her by telephone the dayof the closure and informedherin person the following day
whenit also gave her a check for the amount of account balance. The appellate court
granted summary judgment on the customer’s breachof contract claim finding that
bank substantially complied with (and actually “exceeded”) the account closure
requirements found in the agreement. Id.

In Labat, the record revealed that the

bank’s contractual requirements, promptnotice to the customer andreturn offunds,
were indisputably verified.

That is not the case here, where the contractual

requirements for Rainforest to supply reasonably detailed financial and accounting
information were far more complex and not subject to easyverification.
The financial performance of Trois had long been an issue betweentheparties.
(Bronner Dep., pp. 127-130, 135-136.) Bronner not only invested his own funds
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into the film, he also secured other investors and felt a personal obligation to share
with them accurate information aboutthe film’s financial performance andthestatus
of their investments. (Id., pp. 51, 119, 127-130, 135-136, 139-140, 145-147, 215.)
Reading § 1.6 in its entirety and considering it with the remainder of the
Reconciliation Agreement, the Trois Financial Report would bethe basis for making
distribution decisions, not only to Bronner, but to several investors Bronnersecured.

(Reconciliation Agreement, Recitals ] 4.) Considering the evidencein the light most
favorable to Bronner, he bargained not only for financial information about Trois
but for a formal financial report, completed with a certain level of rigor, where
Rainforest formally outlined for a Trois investor just how the film performed
financially. Accordingly, jury could determinethat efforts to supplement the onepage Trois Financial Report with information informally produced by Rainforest and
the company accountantdid not substantially comply with the “spirit and letter” of
§ 1.6. O.C.G.A. § 13-4-20.
4.1.2 Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of § 2.5 of the Reconciliation
Agreement - Year-End BonusPool

Defendants seek summary judgment on Bronner’s claim that Rainforest failed
to establish Year-End Bonus Pools as required in § 2.5 of the Reconciliation
Agreement.

(Defs. MPSJ, pp. 7-9.) In calculating the Year-End Bonus Pool,

Rainforest was to begin with “an amount equal to three percent (3%) of the net
revenues of [Rainforest] . .. during the recently ended fiscal year”and deduct certain
22

expenses and paymentobligations. (Reconciliation Agreement, § 2.5.) Defendants
assert Rainforest earned no revenues for the period in question thereby nullifying
any obligation to establish a Year-End Bonus Pool. (Defs. MPSJ, pp. 7-9.)
Specifically, Defendants claim, “[w]ith the lack of revenue, it would have beenfutile

to prepare or calculate a Year-End BonusPool.” ? (Id., p. 8.) The Court finds this
argument unconvincing as it ignores the interlocking nature of the various
compensation provisions found in Article II of the Reconciliation Agreement and
the appellate court’s findings about these provisions.
Sections 2.2 through 2.4 of the Reconciliation Agreement establish a
compensation structure whereby Hardy and Packer would share with Rainforest
monies they received for work on Core Business Projects, thereby generating
revenue for Rainforest that would have been subject to the Year-End Bonus Pool.
As a result of the first round of cross summary judgment motions, the Court of
Appeals ruled questions of fact existed as to Hardy’s and Packer’s departure from
this compensation structure and whether their “actions potentially jeopardized
corporate assets, namely Rainforest’s entitlement to a portion of Hardy’s and
Packer’s fees for their loan-out services.”

Rainforest, at p. 27.

This appellate

determination is binding onall future proceedings in this case. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-

"2 Defendants argue that establishing or administering the Year-End BonusPool underthese circumstances would
have been impossible and illegal so as to void the requirement under O.C.G.A. §§ 13-3-5 and 13-8-1. (Defs. MSJ,
p. 8.)
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60(h) (“any ruling by [an appellate court] in a case shall be bindingin all subsequent
proceedingsin that case in the lower court ...”) Because Defendants’ argument that
Rainforest complied withits obligation to establish Year-End BonusPool is entirely
dependent upon Defendants’ contention that Rainforest had no revenues, it is
foreclosed by the appellate ruling.
4.1.3 Plaintiffs Claim for Breach of §§ 2.2-2.4 of the
Reconciliation Agreement _- Rainforest Compensation
Structure
Defendants offer three separate arguments as to why summary judgment
should be granted on Bronner’s claim for breach of §§ 2.2-2.4 of the Reconciliation
Agreement.
4.1.3.1 Claim is Properly Lodged as Derivative.
Defendants argue Bronner has improperly lodged a derivative instead of a
direct claim for alleged breaches of the Reconciliation Agreement’s compensation
structure.

In a shareholder derivative action, the shareholder sues on behalf of the

corporation for the harm done to it, and any damages recovered by the
shareholder are paid to the corporation. Because such an action seeks to
redress a wrong sustained by the corporation rather than the individual
plaintiff, it has long been recognized that the corporation is a proper and
indispensable party.
Barnett v. Fullard, 306 Ga. App. 148, 151 (2010)(citations and punctuation omitted).
However, Bronner’s Third Amended Complaintalleges he alone suffered harm.
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In

describing the breach Plaintiff specifically states, “Defendants Packer and Hardy
were required to fulfill certain requirements and owed certain obligations to
Plaintiff by virtue of the Reconciliation Agreement (emphasis supplied).” (Third
Am. Compl., J 99.) It furtheralleges that this breach, “resulted in pecuniary injury,
harm, loss and damageto Plaintiff’ such that, “Plaintiff is entitled to recover for

any and all damage suffered as a result of Defendant’s breach . . . (emphasis
supplied).” (Id., J 102.)
In their second motionforpartial summary judgment, Defendants argued, and
this Court agreed, that claims based upon the failure to comply with the
Reconciliation Agreement’s compensation structure were properly considered as
derivative, not direct. (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J, filed Jan. 14, 2021, pp. 14-15; Order

on Cross Mots. for Part. Summ. J., p. 30.) Bronner’s recently amended complaint
re-frames that claim as being derivative; however, Defendants now argue Bronner
“has pled himself out of court” by seeking recovery for injuries he has suffered, not
injuries borne by the corporation. (Defs. MPSJ, p. 10.)
Georgia law provides that pleading deficiencies regarding derivative and
direct claims are not fatal. “The determination of whether a claim is derivative or
direct is made by looking to what the pleader alleged and it is the nature of the

wrong alleged andnotthe pleader's designation or stated intention that controls the
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court's decision.” Id. at 152 (emphasis supplied); see also Crittenton v. Southland
Owners Ass’n, Inc., 312 Ga. App. 521, 524 (2011).

The “nature of the wrong alleged” by Bronneris the breach of §§ 2.2-2.4 of
the Reconciliation Agreement which would have negatively impacted Rainforest’s
revenues, harming all Rainforest shareholders, not just Bronner. Id. Accordingly,
the Court again determines that this breach claim is properly considered derivative,
just as Bronnerhascurrently lodged it, despite his myopic viewof the injuries caused
by this breach as described in his Third Amended Complaint. (Order on Cross Mots.
for Part. Summ. J., p. 30; Third Am. Compl., §§ 98-102.)
4.1.3.2 Contract Claim is Not Precluded by Appellate
Ruling on Breach of Fiduciary Duty Tort Claim
In Rainforest, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment
on a discrete portion of Bronner’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. Specifically, it
rejected those fiduciary duty claims based on Hardy and Packer’s misappropriation
of corporate opportunities because,“Plaintiff failed to put forward any evidencethat
there existed any finite, concrete, or specific business opportunity to Rainforest that
wastaken by Hardy or Packer.”

Id. at 41. This decision was basedon the statutory

prohibition that bars corporate officers from appropriating business opportunities
belonging to the corporation that has beenclarified through case law. Id. at 39-41.
Defendants now argue this holding by the Court of Appeals based on a lack

of necessary evidence amounts to a determination “that Hardy and Packer did not
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divert corporate opportunities [which] renders the contract claimsrelated to Sections
2.2-2.4 a nullity.” (Defs. MPSJ, p. 11.) However, this is an overstatement of the
Court of Appeals’ decision. Furthermore,as established above, the Court of Appeals
has already made a determination that questions of material fact exist regarding
Hardy’s and Packer’s departure from the Reconciliation Agreement’s compensation
structure.

Rainforest, pp. 24, 27.

Essentially, Defendants ask this Court to

extrapolate certain meaning from portion ofthe appellate opinion, finding a lack
of evidence to support one of Bronner’s tort claims, and useit to contradict a clear
finding made elsewhere in that same appellate opinion about Bronner’s contract
claims. This the Court refuses to do. It is bound bytheclear findings of Rainforest
that questions of material fact remain about Hardy’s and Packer’s compliance with
the Reconciliation Agreement’s compensation structure. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h).
4.1.3.3, Questions of Fact Exist as to Hardy’s and Packer’s
Compliance

Finally, Defendants argue summary judgment is merited because Hardy and
Packerfulfilled their contractual obligations under §§ 2.2-2.4 of the Reconciliation

Agreement. (Defs. MPSJ, p. 12.) Again, this argument is based on Defendants’
evidence that Rainforest ceased generating revenue. (Id.) And again,the argument
that this evidence entitles Defendant to summary judgment is foreclosed by the
appellate court’s finding that Hardy and Packer abandoned the Reconciliation
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Agreement’s compensation structure in a manner that could have negatively
impacted Rainforest’s revenues. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h).

4.1.4 The Law of the Case Doctrine Bars those PortionsofPlaintiff's
Corporate Waste_and Misappropriation Claims based on the
Payment of Excessive Salaries to the Founders and the Transfer
of Rainforest’s Intellectual Property to Hardy
In Rainforest, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s decision to strike
two discrete portions of Bronner’s claims for waste of corporate assets and
misappropriation of corporate opportunities, specifically the allegations that Hardy
and Packer improperly authorized “excessive salaries” for themselves and
improperly conveyed Rainforest’s intellectual property to Hardy.

Rainforest, pp.

25-26, 37-38. In his Third Amended Complaint, when lodging his corporate waste
and misappropriation claims, Bronnerinexplicably reasserts these same allegations
about excessive salaries and the transfer of Rainforest’s intellectual property. (Third
Am. Compl., {J 93(a) and (d), 96(a) and (d).) The Court agrees with Defendantsthat
Bronner’s attempt to resuscitate these two aspects of his waste and misappropriation
claims is barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h).

(Defs. MPSJ, pp. 12-13.)

However,

rather than enter summary judgmentfor a secondtime onthese allegations, the Court
finds the objectionable portions of Bronner’s corporate waste and misappropriation
claims are immaterial as clearly established by the prior appellate ruling and
therefore should be stricken. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) (court has unilateral power

to strike immaterial matter froma pleading).
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4.2 PlaintiffBernard H. Bronner’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment — Breach of Contract.
Bronner argues he is entitled to summary judgment on liability for
Rainforest’s breach of § 2.5 of the Reconciliation Agreement, requiring it to
establish a Year-End BonusPool. In pertinentpart, it provides,
Within sixty (60) days followingthe end of eachfiscal year, [Rainforest] shall
calculate and establish as a “Year-End Bonus Pool” an amountequalto three
percent (3%) of the next revenues of [Rainforest] and all of its operating
entities . . . during the recently-ended fiscal year. Such calculation shall
include revenues from all sources and shall deduct expenses and other
paymentobligation of such entities, other than (i) wages andsalaries paid to
Hardy and Packer in excess of $175,000,(ii) all payments notspecified herein
that were made to an affiliate of Hardy or Packer, including payments not
specifically identified herein that were made to anaffiliate of Hardy, or
Packer, and (iii) any income tax obligations. (emphasisin original.)
The provision continues with additional reporting and payment requirements.
[Rainforest] shall promptly provide Hardy, Packer and Bronnerwritten
notice of the Year-End Bonus Pool amount, and within fourteen (14) days
after such determination, [Rainforest] shall pay to each of Hardy, Packer and
Bronner, or his personal holding companyorother designee, one-third (1/3)
of the Year-End Bonus Pool. (Emphasis supplied.)
As repeatedly addressed above, Rainforest has presented evidence that no
revenues were earned during the subject time period; however, the Court of Appeals
has determined questions of material fact exist about whether Rainforest failed to
receive revenues to whichit was entitled because the Reconciliation Agreement’s
compensation structure was abandoned. Becauseofthese disputesin the evidence,
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Bronner’s motion for summary judgment regarding any breach for failure to
establish the Year-End Bonus Pool and makedistributions therefrom is denied.
Bronner further argues Rainforest also breached this provision of the
Reconciliation Agreement based on its reporting failures.

He argues even if,

Rainforest was excused from making distributions, it was not excused “from its

reporting obligations.” (Pl. Reply, pp. 2-3; see also Pl. MPSJ, p. 7.)

The Court

finds Plaintiff overstates the clarity of the reporting obligation.
Essentially, the Year-End Bonus Pool is a percentage of the company’s net
revenues.

Section 2.5 directs how to calculate that net revenue figure, specifying

certain expenses that should not be deducted.

Assuming the evidence in the light

most favorable to Defendants, Rainforest generated no revenues in 2012, 2013 or

2014.

In this regard, the Court finds § 2.5 to be ambiguous because the entire

provision is based on the presumption that the Rainforest will have revenues.

Ifa

lack of revenue leaves Rainforest unable to “calculate and establish” a Year-End
BonusPool, it is not clear that Rainforest was requiredto provide the recipients with
“written notice” of the non-existent pool’s amount.

A jury could reasonably

determine in those years where Rainforest had no revenues,all obligations regarding
the Year-End Bonus Pool were mooted. Because this ambiguity, which is created
by an erroneous presumption found within the contractual provisionitself, cannot be
resolved by applying the statutory rules of contract construction, the Court finds a
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jury should determine what the parties intended with this particular reporting
requirement. See generally Wanna v. Navicent Health, Inc., 357 Ga. App. 140, 147
(2020) (ifa court cannotresolve a contractual ambiguity “after applying the rules of
construction, the issue of what the ambiguous language means and whatthe parties
intended mustbe resolved by a jury.”)
The remainderofPlaintiffs motion, seeking attorney’s fees under§ 3.4 of the
Reconciliation

Agreement,

is

dependent

aforementioned breach of contract claim.

upon

his

prevailing

(Pl. MPSJ, p. 9.)

upon

the

Accordingly, it is

denied.
5. CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment - Third Amended Shareholder Direct and Derivative Complaint, is
DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment — Breach of Contract is DENIED. Finally, the Court ORDERS § 93(a)
and (d) as well as § 96(a) and (d) STRICKEN from Plaintiff's Third Amended
Complaint.

fe
SO ORDEREDthis 4

day of September,2021.

JUDGE

fe lyfe

KELLY LEE ELLERBE

Superior Court of Fulton County

Metro Atlanta Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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